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Dorothy English

Managing Editor

Hi, I’m Dorothy. I studied International Relations at Indiana University. I’m currently a MAIS student at the Diplomatische. As one of the magazine’s managing editors, I’ve forged a partnership between ClubDA and POLEMICS to increase the student body’s access to the alumni association. My favourite part about POLEMICS is discovering the topics and issues my classmates care about.

Debanwita Paul

Editor-in-Chief

You can call me Tania! I oversee the Editorial Board and facilitate the work of the team. This year, I am proud to expand our magazine internally and externally with a renovated website, guest contributions from DA alumni and staff, and new sponsors and partnerships. With my background in writing, editing, and managing, I make sure that the magazine is the best it can be!

James Butler

Managing Editor

Hey, I am James, one of two managing editors (yes, there's that much to manage). I am bringing my previous teaching and finance experience to expand the reach of POLEMICS while maintaining its high standards. I am currently spearheading our new alumni subscription program so that POLEMICS can be the bridge between current and former students.

Alexandra Motica

Managing Designer

I am Alex, the newest addition to the POLEMICS Board. With me, I brought my background knowledge of graphic design and the excitement to be part of such an amazing team.

Dennis Vetter

Treasurer

My name is Dennis, money-man of Polemics‘ and ever-unsatisfied part-time editor. My love for writing is what brought me here - and my obsession with detail prevents me from letting go.

Zixiang Hu

Managing Designer

Hi, I am one of the creative managers of POLEMICS. I am also an ETIA student, an enthusiastic photographer, and an opera lover. It's a pleasure to work with such a motivated team! 

The post Meet the Editorial Board appeared first on Polemics.

The final political equilibrium in the Washington D.C. will not be clear until the two January runoff senatorial elections in Georgia. If the Republicans win just one seat then they would have a 51 to 49 majority; however, if the Democrats secure both seats, Vice President-elect Kamala Harris would have the tiebreaking vote. The Democrats retained their majority in the House, albeit decreased by nine, and Biden’s 81 million vote victory is a remarkable but a qualified achievement: it is by no means another “blue wave” that swept the country in the 2018 midterm elections or a mandate for the political platform of the radical Left. With a lean majority in the House and conceivably a minority in the Senate, Biden has no alternative to political moderation and economic expansion matching Trump’s successes prior to COVID-19.

Trump lost despite the support of 74 million voters, nine million more than in 2016. The loyal followers of the Republican perspective were not disheartened by his abrasive personality, questionable morals, disdain for science and disrespect for the rule of law. A vote for Trump shows endorsement of conservative political priorities with a hint of xenophobia, anxiety over globalization and fear of the left-wing activism. Trump lost but Republicanism is robust, well established and represents a significant number of voters. Yet, has Trump become an obstacle for the Republican party?

President Trump energized and polarized the entire political spectrum of the country with his advocacy of the time-honored canons of Republicanism heavily coated with populism. Once the party of WASPs and the wealthy, the GOP has evolved into a party of middle-class Americans, with increasing participation of minorities, who share an aversion to Obamacare, resentment against illegal immigration and are in favor of law-and-order, low taxes, reduced international commitments and neo-mercantilism in foreign trade.

This emerging power make-up in Washington presents the Republicans with a dilemma: either continue to endure Trump or discard his unproven assertions of a nation-wide electoral fraud and promptly regroup behind traditional Republican priorities. With his intransigent supporters the President continues to challenge the legitimacy of certified election results and insist that the judgement delivered at the hands of American voters should be swapped for judicial rulings. Without a single exception Trump’s allegation have been rejected by courts in over thirty states, his Attorney General William Barr and in an unusually perfunctory manner by the Supreme Court of the United States. To keep up the “Stop the Steal” campaign, Trump’s supporters may soon step outside the law.

Trump’s idea of a nation-wide election fraud has no precedent in history of the Republic and signals that Trump’s egocentric drive for power defies respect for the entire legal structure of the country. After dividing the nation, Trump proceeds to damage the Republican Party and belittle the democratic nucleus of the country with his “I shall return” pretension. It is helpful to remember that the President is the only public official in the United States elected by the entire nation.

Four years ago, Trump energized the Republican Party and orchestrated victory in the electoral college after losing the popular vote. He galvanized Republicanism around the tenets of conservative populism. As a President, however, he squandered these assets with his erratic and offensive conduct and alienated several sympathetic to GOP national constituencies. He delivered economic expansion, but his leadership flunked the test on good governance and failed to show compassion at the time of a profound national crisis.

By looking beyond Trump the Republican Party would avoid falling into the pitfall of turning into a cult and instead act as a reasonable political alternative to the radical Left. The rise of the progressive crusade has given the Republicans a well-timed nemesis on par with the threat of communism during the decades of the Cold War. The prospect of progressivism, frequently depicted as a masked socialism, provides an effective political backdrop to broaden the conservative appeal beyond the rank-and-file followers. To stage a political comeback, however, the Party must restore civility at the top and bring forward exemplary leaders akin to Dwight Eisenhower or Ronald Reagan.

Trump’s problems are already Biden’s problems: most notably the Coronavirus pandemic and the economy. After the first one hundred days of Biden’s administration the value of Trump as a whipping boy is likely to decrease even if the former president continues to broadcast his confrontational tweets. President Biden will be expected to make good on the myriad of costly and overreaching pledges he made during the electoral campaign and contain the radical leaning of the Sanders-AOC faithful, without tampering with the traditional bread-and-butter concerns of moderates. This could be an insurmountable undertaking, but the specter of more Trumpism down the road would prop up Biden’s anti-Trump coalition and drive it to the left. The GOP sans Trump gives the moderate Democrats a chance to find common grounds with the Republican center, and for the GOP it offers the opportunity to attract constituencies lost by Trump in 2020.

A return to paralyzing “dead on arrival” obstructionism prevalent during the Obama’s presidency is not a promising tactic to broadening of the GOP’s social appeal. The eventual choice of strategy is dependent on the outcome of Georgia’s runoff elections; however, by pursuing a cherry-picked bipartisanship, the GOP would sway Biden’s ambitions to the center in the process of modernizing national infrastructure, revising environmental regulations, immigration law, policing and other critically important national priorities. Trumpism brings the Democrats together; without Trump, moderate politicians in both parties have a chance to expose progressives as a destabilizing force in Washington. The relative success of the Democratic-Republican joint effort is already evident in the developing bipartisan consensus on the national COVID-19 relief packages. At the same time, symptoms of political squabbles within the Democratic Party are coming to the surface as the left wing has become disgruntled over the allegedly inadequate presence of progressives in Biden’s administration.

Foreign and security policies offer a promising ground for the post-Trump departure from an ineffective and often counterproductive “America First” unilateralism. After all, one of the key pillars supporting the superpower status of the United States is the global alliance system designed to contain imperial ambitions of China and Russia.

There is a national consensus for rebalancing US-China trade relations, as the growing evidence affirms that Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports have done more harm to American consumers than to China. Trump has drawn the much-needed attention to the burden-sharing disparities within NATO, with the United States contributing over 70 percent to the annual operational expenses of the Alliance. It is nevertheless clear and convincingly articulated by the Pentagon that the abrupt and unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe, Afghanistan and Iraq jeopardize global stability. These impulsive steps threaten to unhinge the international order by fostering doubts about the value of American security guarantees and most urgently the credibility of the American commitment to the sovereignty of Taiwan. Washington’s return to a measured liberal internationalism is a well-established common denominator for bipartisanship and a precondition for managing relations with China.

In short, the fate of the nation rests not only in the hands of Biden, but also in the collective prudence of the GOP; will it degenerate into being the party of one man or will it return to being the conservative alternative for all?

Edited by James P. Butler; Photo credits: Rosemary Ketchum, pexels

The post The Post-Trump GOP: Back to the Future? appeared first on Polemics.

The case of Taiwan may provide some answers. While an overwhelming majority of the people living in Taiwan currently consider themselves Taiwanese —distinct from the Chinese across the strait — a mere 30 years ago most perceived themselves as unambiguously Chinese. Furthermore, only 60 years ago, those living on the island did not even speak Mandarin Chinese, much less deem themselves Chinese. The different ways these identity shifts came about demonstrate how the self-perception of a people can be created and altered, even within a single generation.

Being Taiwanese-Japanese

For millennia Taiwan was occupied by its aborigines, who are ethnically and linguistically close to peoples of Southeast Asia. When the Dutch arrived on Taiwan in the sixteenth century, they noted the absence of Chinese there, despite the Chinese Empire across the strait. 

However, following the arrival of the Dutch, Chinese migrants flocked to the island. By the nineteenth century, the great majority of the island’s population was ethnically Chinese, mostly speaking a Fujian-based dialect, known today as Taiwanese Hokkien, or simply Taiwanese.

Only after it had become strategically important did the Chinese Empire start to assert its influence on the island. Taiwan had been a Chinese province for merely ten years when it was ceded to Japan in 1895, following China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. A short-lived attempt to establish the Republic of Taiwan was quickly quashed by newly-industrialized Japan, eager to demonstrate its capabilities as a colonial power. 

Japanese ideology was instilled into the populace and the Japanese language became an essential part of the education system, with many Taiwanese studying at Japanese universities. The island rapidly industrialized; by 1930, its railway network was a quarter the size of that of China, and living standards increased dramatically. Meanwhile, in Mainland China, the Empire was overthrown and the Republic of China was claimed under unopposed Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) rule.

Being Chinese

Following the Japanese defeat in 1945, Chinese Nationalist forces took control of Taiwan, which had been viewed with suspicion by the new Chinese rulers, aware that 200,000 Taiwanese soldiers had fought in the war on the Japanese emperor’s side. The majority of people on the island spoke Taiwanese and Japanese and followed Japanese customs and culture. 

The KMT government was keen to re-Sinicize the island, as it was losing ground in the civil war against Communist forces on the Mainland. When in early 1947 the Taiwanese independence movement gained traction, the KMT cracked down mercilessly. The massacre of February 28th, 1947 that ensued claimed the lives of 30,000 Taiwanese and marked the beginning of what became known as the White Terror. 

In the following months, tens of thousands of civilians were murdered. Under martial law, even wearing Japanese wooden clogs was enough reason to be shot. In 1949, after the decisive defeat of Nationalist forces on the Mainland, the KMT elite, together with two million Mainland Chinese, retreated to Taiwan and added to its existing population of seven million. 

Having lost the war against the Communists on the Mainland, who proclaimed the People’s Republic of China, the KMT was determined to keep the Republic of China alive in Taiwan, to one day retake all of China. But they first had to subdue the Taiwanese people. Martial law was maintained, and a hard-authoritarian regime oversaw the transformation from a Taiwanese-Japanese identity to a patriotic Chinese one. 

Speaking any language other than Mandarin Chinese was illegal, as was even using the word “Taiwan” in one’s business name. The school curriculum was Chinese-centered and patriotic, with Taiwan depicted as having always been an integral part of China. Additionally, every person was ascribed with an ancestral homeland on the Mainland. 

Those who grew up in this jingoistic regime felt unambiguously Chinese. It, therefore, came as a shock when in 1971 the People’s Republic replaced the Republic as ‘China’ in the United Nations and across virtually all other international organizations. Suddenly, Taipei was no longer seen as the legitimate government of China by the global community.

Being Taiwanese

When offered to compete as ‘Taiwan’ in the 1976 Olympic Games, Taipei refused to participate altogether. The idea of competing as anything other than ‘China’ was considered absurd. However, doubt in the resolutely Chinese identity started to foment in the increasingly well-educated populace. 

The world had rejected Taiwan as the center of China, and the grand dream of recapturing the Mainland had become an impossibility. The people living on the island of Taiwan had to come to terms with there already being a ‘China,’ one with stronger claims to Chinese identity. Hence a separate, non-Chinese identity started to form, with demands for democracy and freedom of expression growing, until the government could no longer suppress them. 

Martial law was finally lifted in 1987, and one year later, Lee Teng-Hui became Taiwan’s first native-born president. In 1989, the first credible survey on identity showed that 52% of people still felt purely Chinese, while the majority of the remainder saw themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. However, under President Lee, the change in self-perception accelerated. 

After authoritarian laws were amended and it became legal to openly discuss Taiwanese identity and even independence, the previously-underground independence movement emerged and founded the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which now controls both the legislature and the presidency. 

Nonetheless, no attempt at formal independence from China has been made. Beijing has made it clear on many occasions that formal independence means war. Even though Taipei has given up on the idea of reunification, Beijing has not. 

A 2016 poll found that 73% of inhabitants see themselves as purely Taiwanese, with much of the rest holding dual identities. Self-declared Taiwanese have embraced their heritage, including Taiwan’s distinct history and the Taiwanese language, both of which are now taught in school, and they pride themselves on their liberal democratic values that set them apart from the authoritarian neighbor.

Being Taiwanese can mean many things, but perhaps the most important aspect of ‘Taiwaneseness’ is that of not being Chinese. Beijing insists that Taiwan is a breakaway province that must reunite with the Mainland, but by now, nine out of ten Taiwanese disapprove of reunification entirely. Every war game or statement advocating reunification from Beijing strengthens Taiwanese nationalist fervor, and this time its origins began from the bottom-up, rather than being instilled by brute force or economic incentives.

Being a Work-in-Progress

There are different origins to all national identities, some centuries old, while others have only emerged in living memory, like that of the Taiwanese. But regardless of an identity’s age or insistence of primordial existence, the claim that identity is forever should be questioned. Taiwan’s case demonstrates that even national identities are malleable and might change drastically within the span of a mere generation, perhaps not so different from an individual’s identity throughout their own life.  

Edited by Sandra Edelbacher; Photo credit: Alexandra Motica

The post The Origin of Identity: <br/>The Case of Taiwan’s Identity Shifts appeared first on Polemics.

While formulating a response to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, nine EU countries wrote a letter to the EU Council demanding for a joint European debt mechanism known as Coronabonds. The controversial proposal was sent out by southern European countries including Spain, Italy, and France, which are among the most affected by the virus, and it was supported by Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta. The idea of Eurobonds, now called coronabonds, gained popularity during the 2009-2012 European sovereign debt crisis and are debt instruments that would be issued by the Eurozone rather than a single country. This would mean that indebted states have access to cheaper credit due to the strength of other eurozone economies whilst these stronger economies would have to support the risk in case of default. 

Coronabonds follow the same principle as common social bonds in accordance with United Nations principals and the Sustainable Development Goals and would serve to jointly finance the expenditure dealing exclusively with the damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the idea was rejected by Estonia and the “Frugal Four”: Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria because it would indicate that their taxpayers would be on the line for countries who have continued to live beyond their means. These countries are pushing for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which would be a joint issuance for the eurozone and with a target budget of 400€ billion to help countries in crisis. Governments and central banks need to increase their deficits right now to address this crisis and soften the economic shock. Higher deficits, however, mean lower credit ratings which means it is harder to access credit markets, potentially exacerbating the vicious cycle for high indebted countries such as Spain and Italy, two of the worst-hit by the pandemic and by the 2008 financial crises. To avoid this scenario, these states are pushing for programs such as coronabonds whose issuance is not based on their sovereign credit rating. The “Frugal Four” are reluctant to accept this because, in the case of a default of a country, the more economically stern countries are exposed to potentially enormous risks. Instead, they back up alternative options such as ESM programs—however, these would be only used by financially weaker countries, carrying a stigma in the markets and potentially downgrading ratings further.

Once again, the EU faces a unity and identity test. In the letter sent to the European Council, state leaders emphasized the need for a response that benefits all member states, which would most importantly “provide the strongest message to our citizens about European determined cooperation and resolve to provide an effective and united response.” And yet, the European Union endured this North-South existential during the 2008 economic crisis and again in the 2016 refugee crisis. Just like those situations, the current pandemic is due to an exogenous shock where no single EU country is exclusively responsible. However, northern and southern EU countries keep trading barbs: if the northern frugal states keep distrusting the southern countries, then the eurozone will remain a region-based only on currency, where the south will always be at a disadvantage and the North-South divide will persist.

However, in a surprising turn of events, Merkel joined Macron in recommending a euro fund, signaling a step towards greater integration. The idea proposed will task the European Commission to raise 500€ billion in public markets and use this money as grants for sectors and regions most affected by the coronavirus. This Franco-German proposal is not the direct debt sharing southern countries demanded but is nonetheless a step in that direction. It is also a marked change for Germany who had proposed a recovery through loans rather than grants. This change of course was largely due to the German Constitutional Court has legally challenged the European Central Bank regarding its bond-buying programs which would mean the biggest tool Europe to deal with the pandemic could be made unavailable altogether.

Nevertheless, plenty of questions remain. On the one hand, the allocation of these funds would be done via the 2021-2027 EU budget and thus, a unanimous vote would have to be reached by the EU-27. However, Austria has insisted that aid should come in the form of loans and not grants. On the other hand, details of how the recovery fund would work and its distribution remain unknown. The proposal pointed towards some form of conditionality, particularly that the access to the recovery fund “will be based on a clear commitment of member States to follow sound economic policies and an ambitious reform agenda.” Figuring out the allocation of strings for the fund will be the next big discussion among member states.  The larger question remains: what will happen to Europe in the future? With vivid North-South tensions, a post-pandemic scenario threatens more than just the economy—it threatens the existence of the European Union. Agreeing on a joint political and economic response is of the utmost importance to deliver a message of cohesion and solidarity to the EU citizens and actors; the Franco-German proposal marks a historic step in that direction. When the two giants at the heart of the EU come together, it is hard for other member states to resist their pull, but getting Austria, the Netherlands, and other countries on board will be a considerable task. How can a European Union, with an inflexible history of opposing economic behaviors, be sustainable? How long can this North-South discrepancy persist and what will become of the EU if it does? These recent crises only emphasize the fact that if the European project is to have any substantive future, the only way forward is to reevaluate the foundations of the EU and create new treaties that can effectively face the challenges we face today by strengthening cooperation amongst states

Edited by James P. Butler

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has integrated in various economic and military organizations to reemerge as a power in the Eurasian region. Among these, the establishment of the CSTO was the most relevant to promote Russia’s defensive policy and function as a security pillar in the region. Acting as a security regime, the CSTO nowadays formally cooperate with different security-oriented organizations and stakeholders; nevertheless, it has no cooperation with its western counterpart, NATO. In order to weaken Russia’s geopolitical role in the post-Soviet space, NATO has shown no willingness to collaborate with the CSTO despite several attempts made by the CIS representatives to establish ties.Given that NATO and CSTO pursue similar objectives – to ensure security in the region – both blocs are often compared with each other.

In this regard, one may compare key articles within the founding treaties of both alliances that reveal inconsistencies in the actions requested by each organization from their member states. NATO’s Article 5 emphasizes obligatory actions against armed attack, including the use of armed force. The CSTO’s Articles 3 and 5, in comparison, underlines the voluntary nature of participation between its member states and the supremacy of national sovereignty, with few list of obligations in regards to collective defense. Even the Soviet predecessor of the CSTO, the Warsaw Pact of 1955, stated a larger degree of actions in response to a security threat. This exposes the shallow aims of the CSTO in comparison to the expansive objectives of and deep involvement within NATO.

Looking at the composition, the CSTO includes only six states belonging to the CIS: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, while NATO includes 30 allied countries with North Macedonia as its newest member in 2020. Unlike NATO, the CSTO does not consider the prospects of expanding its membership. However, it is worth noting that NATO member states never sell arms to a country that is regarded as a potential military adversary to the member states. Whereas Russia and Belarus provide 85% of weapon-sales to Azerbaijan, which is not a member of the CSTO and has significant disagreements with Armenia. Yet despite these incongruences, the CSTO does have some inherent strengths such as the absence of a language barrier – all servicemen speak Russian – contributes to more efficient military coordination between the member states.  Another advantageous feature is that the organization only deals with regional security issues and does not have any other dimensions, such as humanitarian aims, unlike NATO.

In terms of similarities between the two alliances, one can question why the CSTO is frequently called “Russian NATO” or “mini-NATO” although the organization clearly is inferior to the North Atlantic Alliance in terms of the military capabilities of its member states, as demonstrated by the differences in military budgets, the number of armed forces/military equipment, and experience in real combat conditions. Yet the mobilization capacity of both groups is approximately the same – NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) stands at about 25 thousand people, while CSTO’s RRF is between 17-22 thousand. In addition to common characteristics, combatting terrorism remains a central topic for both blocs, which calls for strong international cooperation not only between the two alliances but also among the leading countries.

Today’s problems of interaction between two alliances come from a variety of sources. As the Acting CSTO Secretary General Valery Semerikov noted, the Organization is ready for “active regional and international interaction, and sees great potential in the field of combating terrorism; however, NATO has often made judgments that the Alliance does not see the need for such ties”.

Although NATO does not cooperate with the CSTO as a separate entity, the Alliance collaborates with individual CSTO members, indicating a lack of a common political direction within the CSTO. It is no secret that almost all CSTO members have concluded bilateral agreements with the alliance and do not perceive the USA or EU as potential enemies.For example, prioritizing Russia in military affairs did not stop Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the US and NATO. A distinctive feature of the cooperation was the initiative to enter the Partnership for Peace program as well as the continuation of the tactical military exercise “Steppe Eagle”, hosted by Kazakhstan and operated under NATO-led command. It is also worth noting the special attention of the USA/NATO to the development of relations with Georgia and Ukraine. Events in Ukraine and Georgia have shown that the CIS region is unpredictable, and it is in the interest of Russia to consider the vast differences that now exist in the post-Soviet area.

Despite the above-mentioned challenges of interaction between two alliances, as well as Russia’s continuing negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion, today’s military and political situation dictate an immediate need for cooperation, primarily in counter-terrorism. Since the US and Russia are positioned as leaders of NATO and CSTO, it is of paramount importance to build a relationship between Washington and Moscow based on dialogue and the ability to understand each other’s actions. Otherwise, the continuance of the US and Russia’s intransigence will occur at the expense of not only them, but of the entire international community.

Edited by Gustav Pedersen

Picture taken by Steve Buisinne from Pixaby.com

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Let us examine how fashion has been used in the 21st century as a political tool:

• The Pantsuit Nation – Hilary Clinton suits up for election day;
• Outfits in black colour – Hollywood is against sexual harassment;
• Outfits in orange colour – UN Women advocate for women rights and make a stand against violence towards women;
• The “Black bloc” – European anarchists and Russian social nationalists aim to deter the police from identifying their faces;
• “Pussyhats” – Protest fashion against American president Donald Trump; 
• White bandanas – #tiedtogether to donate to the American Civil Liberties Union or the UN Refugee Agency;
• Black berets à la guerilla; the Mouvement des Gilets jaunes, and so many others.

These prime examples are political statements and fashion accessories. Today political circles, eager for more voters, are “tailored” to manipulate their voters. Politicians have come to realize how much they can play with voters’ minds by sending signals through fashion. What message should they transmit through their style? Hillary Clinton pantsuits became the subject of debate instead of the debate itself. More and more politicians focus on the message their fashion is sending: a “perfect” outfit transmits the vision of being a superwoman or a superman. Political leaders with no taste confuse the public. People are more involved in analyzing the outfit than the political message of the dresser. Fashion is used to convey good news or obscure an unpopular message, to build a vision or act as a smokescreen to divert voter attention from questionable policies. 

When a woman dresses in poor taste, many will concern themselves only with the outfit. Female politicians are more often judged by their appearance than their male counterparts. Are female voices less important than their appearance? Merkel and May do not have to worry about their fashion: Merkel’s cookie cutter suit or May’s Ferragamo shoes reflect the power of their position. Nevertheless, why do people even notice? Do you remember what Macron wore yesterday?

Designers want to provoke. They want to make a mockery of overt sexuality. Has it become unfashionable to be sexy? Not at all. The union of yin and yang can be sexy even when compared to strong masculinity or overt femininity. Haute couture brands create clothing targeted at representatives of this new woke culture, where there are no clear boundaries between the two sexes and their clothing. 

What do these transformations mean? The trend towards a “unisex” style of fashion does not reject gender differences but instead invites the observer to enter into a dialogue. Fashion which can be worn by men and women questions women’s traditional roles: no longer limited to reproductive and “private” functions. Society expects men to transmit more than brute force. They must have the ability to be sensitive and show feelings. We are faced with a completely new playing field for the fashion industry – gender roles are vanishing; personal expression has become tantamount. 

Power and status become more valuable than female or male dress codes. Clothing worn in protest has a dangerously pacifying effect. By wearing protests, people run the risk of losing motivation to actually join the political and civil debate. Fashion is about irony, playfulness and ambivalence. Political discourse, on the other hand, is serious. Better to start the dialogue with a joke (on a T-shirt) than to refrain from joining the debate. In Eastern Europe, Eytys sneakers and T-shirts with slogans are an excellent way to start a social and political discourse, albeit with an inappropriate joke. 

We live in a more dangerous, divided and uncertain world: Brexit, Donald Trump, populist leaders in Europe, and COVID-19 – all these events negatively affect the fashion industry and can significantly reduce profits. In March 2020, at the onset of the coronavirus outbreak, Christian Louboutin was in trouble. This world-renown shoe designer was heavily reliant on production facilities in Italy and Spain and needed glue from China. All three countries were fighting an epidemiological battle and went into lockdown. However, steady players can quickly rebuild their business models and profit from changing circumstances. After Britain’s Brexit vote, the Guardian on 19 February 2017 headlined an article featuring Brexiteers and EU-supporters going out and spending roughly the same amount on fashion: one group celebrated, while the other group shopped to relieve stress. The fashion industry profited nonetheless.

We are the creators and architects of our reality, and this is reflected in the clothes we wear. There are high demands on our appearance in a modern world dominated by social media. The focus on appearance has never been as imperative as it is now. Our external world is dominated by surfaces of urban architecture created, as a possible backdrop to broadcast visual content. We are confronted with non-stop visual communication and imagery. Text without a visual loses its power. Similarly, our speech is diminished without the correct look.

In a world that worships imagery, what shapes power and status? Gender? Fashion? None of the above. Power ultimately derives its essence from individuality – whether it is choosing a belief, a political cause, or even an outfit.

Edited by Diana Mauter Markhof

Picture taken by Gage Skidmore from Flickr.com

The post Sex, Politics, Gender and Fashion: How clothes shape power and status appeared first on Polemics.

As the COVID-19 pandemic has put the world into lockdown, traffickers all around the globe are capitalising on the most vulnerable members of society. The top three means of exploitation are forced labour, sexual trafficking, and debt bondage. 

At first glance, the closing of borders, the implementation of national curfews, and restrictions on traveling as a result of the rising healthcare concerns might suggest a decline in the number of trafficked victims given the reduced general demand for contact jobs (sex industry, temporary and seasonal labour, domestic servitude). However, in the realm of organized crime the opposite occurred. With more people feeling anxious about their immediate future, vulnerable populations have allowed traffickers to seize the opportunity to vector the new anxieties directly into their criminal activities and exploit the new “normal”. This situation transpired, because, rather than restricting trafficking, the pandemic only limited the resources of  the systems designed to curb it.

With primary needs being relocated to hospitals, border controls, and essential services, new societal vulnerabilities rise to the surface. These vulnerabilities are none other than those described by the “push & pull” factors: extreme poverty, unemployment, and lack of education. They, in turn, are compounded with the demand for cheap labour, free-market economies, and the commodification of sex. In light of this, the authorities assigned with addressing the phenomenon are now diverting resources meant for fighting crime towards battling shortages directly related to COVID-19. At the same time, prevention and assistance services are either being reduced or even shut down altogether.

As of April 2020, the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) has revealed that the two most common forms of exploitation registered amid COVID-19 were sexual exploitation (53.66%) and forced labour (41.81%). In both instances, the pandemic-induced human trafficking was mainly caused by the disruption of supply chains which in turn created a market power-vacuum for exploitative working conditions. In the case of labour trafficking, industries lent money to confined irregular workers as a means to secure debt bondage, whereas in the sex industry, the temporary prohibition of work due to the lockdown pushed some of the industry’s workers further underground, increasing their vulnerability to sex trafficking. There remains then a key question: how are such activities identified in the first place, and who are the vulnerable people the traffickers keep preying on?

According to the 2000 Palermo Protocol, a criminal activity falls under the framework of human trafficking if it consists of three cumulative conditions: an act (recruitment, transfer, harbouring), a means (threat, coercion, fraud, deception), and a purpose (sexual exploitation, forced labour, removal of organs, etc.). Opposed to the smuggling of migrants, in which the crime ends at the arrival of destination, trafficking only begins once the victims are brought to their place of assignment. As such, rather than putting a ceiling on criminal activities, the COVID-19 crisis has introduced a consistent basis for the expansion of key drivers in human trafficking: increased insecurity, poverty, and marginalisation.

Funding the road to forced labour

The apparent lack of prioritization of human rights within Europe’s food supply is mostly apparent in the migrant work conducted within the informal and agricultural sectors. Those trapped in seasonal labour, oftentimes in overcrowded accommodation with little or no safety measures, have no choice but to continue working. As reported by Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), the recent travel restrictions have complicated the prospect for temporary workers in agriculture, increasing the demand for trafficked third-country migrants, inversely proportional with the decrease of labour inspections. As a result, those stuck in this line of work have become far more exposed to being infected due to their precarious working and housing conditions. Despite these risks, countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, or Austria have steeply increased their import of workers from Eastern Europe (mainly Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria) to plug the gaps caused by COVID-19.

Whether needed in health and social care, in slaughterhouses or on farms, chartered flights are bringing in migrant workers on a constant basis, with many shuttling back and forth for weeks between the host and receiving country. The de facto on-the-job quarantine case of Romanian seasonal workers in Germany has been particularly revealing, as the one-off initiative to import the cheap and reliable workforce has resulted in a public protest condemning the poor living and working conditions, ultimately culminating in a proposal to change the German labour legislation. Yet the narrative is far from coming to a close. With Western economic powerhouses dictating the terms of conditions of seasonal labour, Eastern European governments freely accept the trade to the detriment of the health of their citizens. The true victims of exploitation in the age of a pandemic, the seasonal workers, get caught in between a web of initial promises and guarantees, and an entrenched reality of dependency, exploitation, and abuse. As the Romanian National Anti-Trafficking Agency points out, because of the plethora of agents involved (going from country-based recruiters, to subcontractors, intermediary employers and broker agencies), the chain between employer and employee is disconnected, to the disadvantage of the workers.

Nonetheless, whilst it remains difficult to assess the long-term impacts of COVID-19 in the midst of the outbreak, the ongoing crisis can still provide an opening for new paradigm shifts, especially in the legislative realm of  employers working with migrants and vulnerable workers. Still, to be successful, such changes need to thrust out  the old convictions that a temporary falling economic demand outweighs the values of human rights and dignity. Whether taking place in the form of recruitment through means of coercion, fraud, or deception, trafficking continues to persist as a predatory behaviour, with those most susceptible to it not being anywhere near a position of power to push  for  change. For this reason, Europe’s response to COVID-19 continues to reveal new sides of this human trafficking crisis, highlighting aspects which we already knew about, such as the entrenched economic and hierarchical inequalities that still render some segments of the population more vulnerable than others. COVID-19 has shown the world a reality of disproportionate disparities, exposing and, simultaneously, exacerbating the situation of those most vulnerable to acute poverty, exploitation, and abuse.

Edited by Nina Waldsam

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A measure of inequality

As the preferred measure of governments around the world to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdowns have successfully curtailed the spread of the virus. However, this preventive measure has also worsened the predicament of domestic violence victims and exposed social inequalities more than ever before.

Confinement has been an unbearable reality for many people, especially individuals in impoverished communities who have had to manage in cramped spaces and overcrowded neighbourhoods. It has also been extremely challenging for workers in informal sectors to comply with confinement measures without losing their only means of income.

Besides social and economic factors, we must also consider the pandemic’s impact on gender issues. The burden of childcare and housework disproportionately affect’s women, which reveals the entrenchment of gender roles even in 2020. Nevertheless, COVID-19’s amplification of domestic violence is most troubling. Even before the current pandemic, one third of the entire female population experienced some form of violence by a partner or non-partner during their lifetime. Research shows that aggression intensifies with stress, uncertainty, and economic instability—all side effects of the current crisis. On top of that, legally mandated lockdowns impede victims from reaching support networks, making it far more difficult for them to get help or find shelter.

Abusers can easily twist the circumstances of the pandemic to their benefit. They manipulate their victims with the threat that leaving their houses may have legal or life-threatening consequences, thereby furthering their isolation.

“We won’t leave Europe’s women alone” Shortly after European countries enacted lockdown measures, we saw two distinct consequences: a surge in domestic violence cases in most countries, decreased calls to helplines, and with minor exceptions where cases were either lower or remained the same. Belgium, France, and Ireland reported a rise in domestic violence cases. In France, there was at least a 30% increase in police intervention during the first week of confinement. In Spain, there was a 47% increase during the first two weeks. Fewer calls made helplines in countries such as Italy and Britain, seem to suggest that victims were under increased surveillance. Nonetheless, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland reported no rise in violence cases. 

Upon realizing the terrible and undesirable effects of their restrictions, European governments have acted to tackle them. In April, a press release by the European Parliament stated that they would not “leave Europe’s women alone” and requested that member states give support to victims during the pandemic. Since then, helplines were expanded, and new shelters were created. Cell phone apps and websites were promoted to contact support inconspicuously. The Canary Islands implemented an effective and creative campaign that allows women to use a code word to secretly request assistance while pretending to buy a face mask at pharmacies. Other Spanish cities and France have followed suit.

To further redeem themselves, governments have allocated accommodations for victims in hotels and AirBnBs in an effort to maintain social isolation. They have also assured women that they can leave their houses if they need to go to a safe place. Furthermore, with the apparent belated realization that many cases may well end in femicide (intentional killing of women on grounds of their gender), the Scottish Government launched a commercial that urges victims to seek help as soon as possible “during the current coronavirus situation.”

Just a drop of water in the ocean

By all assessments, Europe is the leading continent in tackling gender disparity. If women suffer violence to such extent there, we must consider how dismal the reality is for the rest of the world. The crisis aggravated an already precarious position for women suffering from violence. This problem was foreseeable and indeed forewarned. Although local police reports of domestic violence in China tripled in February, the warning was overlooked and the same series of events unfolded again and again all over the world: lockdowns were decreed and when there was an evident increase in cases, governments tried to quickly come up with measures to remedy what their actions had already worsened.

All types of violence against women remain “the most widespread but among the least reported human rights abuses.” Logically, a public health crisis that affects so many should inspire greater efforts. However, the facts suggest otherwise.

Edited by Dennis Vetter

Picture of Nandhu Kumar from Pexels.com

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If I asked you to list the greatest challenges facing the world right now, you might first think of COVID-19, the climate crisis, or the resurgence of populism. You might not think of phosphorus, or the lack thereof. Phosphorus is essential to human life, and critically, it is one of the three most important plant nutrients and essential for the global food production. According to the UN, the rising global population will plateau at around eleven billion people towards the end of this century. And yet, our global phosphorus reserves are expected to peak in the 2030’s and decline steadily afterwards. To secure long-term food security, it is vital that we start to implement measures to ensure a sustainable use of this resource in the near future. 

Why Is Phosphorus So Important?

To comprehend the dimensions of a potential phosphorus scarcity, it is key to understand two of its characteristics: It is both non-replaceable and finite. According to Liebig’s Law, plant growth will always be stifled by its limiting factor: the least available nutrient. This means that a plant which does not have enough phosphorus will not thrive, even if other nutrients are plentiful. Up until the 19^th century, the phosphorus used in agriculture came mainly from manure. The nutrient cycle was a relatively closed loop, however the discovery that phosphorus can be mined changed this fact. Today, most phosphorus comes from geological deposits of phosphate rock, and therefore has certain environmental boundaries, which are depleting at an alarming rate. 

Unequal Distribution: Phosphorus Is in The Hands of Few

85% of the remaining phosphorus reserves are controlled by five countries: Morocco, China, Algeria, Jordan, and Syria. Morocco alone is in possession of 75% of available deposits, due to its control over Western Sahara. The OCP Group, which is owned by the King of Morocco, is the largest company in the field of phosphorus mining and production. The US previously held the largest reserve, but estimates suggest that they will have been depleted within 25 years. Australia, India, the European Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa rely heavily on imports. This distribution presents both potential risks and rewards. On the one hand, it can create market instability. Caused by a risk of price spikes, fluctuations in availability and monopoly formation. On the other hand, there is the opportunity for collaboration.  Researchers agree that cooperation will be a key requirement for more sustainable phosphorus management.

Phosphorus Governance: Mind the Gap!

Despite the blatant inequality, the extraction and use of phosphorus is barely governed. In fact, phosphorus only seems to have come to policy makers attention as recently as 2008 when China raised the export tariffs on phosphorus by 100%, leading to a rise of the global price rose from around $50 to $430 per ton. Research suggests that this led to a rise in global awareness on the value of phosphorus. In 2009, the Global Partnership on Nutrient Management (GPNM) was launched by the UN, which tries to promote a more sustainable use of these dwindling reserves. The GPNM works with various partners such as universities, agricultural ministries, companies, and civil society organizations to “steer dialogues and actions to promote effective nutrient management” (GPNM).

In 2013, the European Sustainable Phosphorus Platform was established with the primary goal of enhancing the knowledge exchange on sustainable phosphorus use between a similarly developed countries. A year afterwards, phosphorus appeared on the EU List of Critical Raw Materials. It is the only mineral on this list that is directly linked to food security, which is “a clear signal from the EU that there is concern about the security of R[aw] P[hosphorus] supply”. Regarding EU law, researchers found that there is a severe lack of legal basis to ensure a sustainable use of phosphorus. When Hukari, Hermann, and Nättorp looked into the matter, one of their main conclusions was that “current EU-legislation neither hinders nor actively supports building of recovery installations.” In other words, the EU is aware of a potential phosphorus shortage, but the current legislation is not yet sufficient to prevent it.

A Problem We Could Solve, Or: How to Phosphor

Phosphorus can be recovered from wastewater and some countries and communities are already follow this method. The city of Zurich has developed plans for a phosphorus recycling station. An analysis showed that Switzerland could cover the majority of its phosphorus usage by recycling. Research also suggests other strategies for a sustainable use of phosphorus. Cordell and White point out that 80% of phosphorus “is lost between the mine and the fork.” Much of the loss occurs in the mining process, alongside the production of waste which contains heavy metals such as Cadmium and radioactive material. Some inefficiencies occur in the agricultural system and the consumption process such as with food waste, for example. Another opportunity to reduce inefficiency exists in changing our diet. Meat-based nutrition requires a much higher quantity of phosphorus in production than plant-based nutrition. 

Phosphorus is vital to ensure long-term food security. Despite this reality our current way of using our reserve is not sustainable. Nevertheless, scarcity can be avoided if we take immediate and decisive action. Phosphorus must be recycled and reused; it must be processed and utilized as efficiently as possible. Changes must be implemented, not only in the mining process, but also in the agricultural system, the food industry, as well as in our daily dietary choices. Such change need to be orchestrated on all levels, from the individual to the regional, national, and most importantly international levels through cooperation and collaboration. Governance is key to ensuring a sustainable use of phosphorus. 

Edited by Yegor Sheshtunov

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