With little media coverage, but many political questions that often go beyond its borders, the Kingdom of Cambodia remains one of the most curious cases of diplomatic dilemmas in Indochina.
As a fairly recent initiate to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Cambodia plays a modest role in the region, due to its developing economy and restrictive national politics that affect basic rights, such as the freedom of media or free elections. Having a one-party government, however, doesn’t seem to disrupt interstate relations, as its current Prime Minister, Hun Manet, aims at enhancing his country’s role in Southeast Asia where, unsurprisingly, China has a great deal of geopolitical interest as a superpower widely known for its global trade ambitions and maritime presence. Even though ASEAN might be generally considered a safe haven for Cambodia, it would be geopolitically prudent to assume that existing in the proximity of a great power, such as China, could make political matters more difficult and, sometimes, even doubtful because of Cambodia’s communist past and historical ties with Beijing.
Since most ASEAN members have different political regimes, a common vision for regional developments has always been a rare achievement, especially in recent years. This is due to various disagreements on Chinese activities in the South China Sea and Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, which many believe to have been supported by Beijing.
Less-known by the international community, but politically impactful in Indochina, the historically rooted Sino-Cambodian friendship is one of the main reasons why Phnom Penh (Cambodia’s capital) finds it difficult to take a strong stance on regional matters as well as ASEAN’s criticism of Chinese geopolitics. As Beijing has offered financial assistance worth more than a quarter of Cambodia’s GDP, it is clear that such friendship also comes with occasional policy implications. Having veto powers within ASEAN, Cambodia has the ability to block the policy-making process, including decisions directed as sanctions against China; however, these actions may lead to Cambodia’s regional isolation, as well as to increased economic reliance on China.
From the Cambodian perspective, choosing between ASEAN and Beijing seems rather complex because there are several aspects at stake: Cambodia’s political reliability in the region, its economic status, and national interest with the latter fundamentally influencing Prime Minister Hun Manet’s vision which leans toward friendship with China.
Since ASEAN countries have different levels of economic development, smaller actors like Cambodia need to choose their strategy carefully; therefore, it is no surprise that Phnom Penh continues to nurture the partnership with China whose economic and military prowess is more than capable of ensuring a stable future for its allies in Southeast Asia.
As a matter of fact, in January 2022, the Free Trade Agreement between Cambodia and China came into effect, meaning that over 90% of interstate tariffs have been eliminated. Aside from tariff reductions, this pact promotes stronger collaboration in services, investment, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), e-commerce, and economic technology. By improving economic connections, both China and Cambodia aim at maximizing the agreement’s advantages for their businesses and consumers.
Clearly, economic benefits have always been and still remain the primary driving factor behind an alliance or partnership. However, in regions prone to power dynamic shifts and political imbalance, the formation and longevity of interstate relations depend on much more than the economy. As in Cambodia’s case, an alliance with a great power like China not only benefits the country’s development, but it also balances the dominant tendencies of slightly more powerful neighbours, precisely those other ASEAN members that might have more influence within the organization due to their regional political weight and steady economic growth.
To counter potential ASEAN inequalities, relying on China could improve Cambodia’s domestic conditions, even though that could also mean gradual isolation from neighbours. In case of isolation, the Cambodian government would always have Chinese support as a safety net.
Though some skeptical sources suggest that the Cambodian government may eventually drift away from Beijing because of the United States’ trade interests in Southeast Asia, the probability of a Sino-Cambodian separation remains quite low. Actually, Cambodian exports to China have increased significantly in recent years, emphasizing the practical benefits of their long-term economic partnership. Major projects like the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, the Siem Reap International Airport, and several energy programs demonstrate China’s longstanding commitment to Cambodia’s economic development, which is exactly why the Cambodian government is unlikely to give up its strong ties with Beijing.
Apart from that, China and Cambodia keep strong links of security and defense. Their strategic bilateral reliance is reflected in joint military exercises, training programs, and capacity-building projects. Additionally, the Sino-Cambodian friendship covers humanitarian, cultural, and educational projects that offer, in the long run, a durable social development for the youth of Cambodia, which benefits annually from Chinese scholarships and language programs.
The speculations around the potential future distancing of Cambodia from China have also been fueled by the US Navy’s plan to visit Cambodia’s coast because of renovations at the Ream Naval Base, which are allegedly linked to Beijing’s maritime interests. In this regard, Chinese military interests are a sensitive topic for Cambodia to discuss with powers from the Global North, given their concerns about any potential disputes in the South China Sea that might arise as a result of Beijing’s investments in Cambodia.
In spite of its ASEAN membership and the West’s disapproval, the Kingdom of Cambodia acts in its own interest by continuing its multi-dimensional partnership with China, following in the footsteps of many other countries in Asia, where national interest and bilateral alliances appear to offer more advantages than regional organizations. Not even ASEAN’s ties with the European Union seem to convince Phnom Penh to maintain neutrality with Beijing, which further proves that state actors in the Global South are no longer that interested in fostering relations with Western counterparts – their former colonizers.
By analyzing Cambodia’s interesting case and comparing it to other Asian countries, such as Mongolia or North Korea, which have also recently aligned with a non-Western great power, a new political trend is emerging within the international order: a “great global rebalancing” as expert Samir Puri has iterated in his latest book, “Westlessness: The Great Global Rebalancing”, which argues that new great powers are steadily gaining more influence amongst Global South actors.
Whether or not Cambodia decides to refresh its ASEAN status mostly depends on its partnership with Beijing, but, as mentioned earlier, an estrangement from China is highly unlikely due to their shared political and socio-cultural ties. This proves that relations in the Global South have never been stronger, especially now that reliance on Western powers is no longer a ‘must’ for Asian powers to thrive and find their own way in the international community.
Written by: Xenia Oana Cojocaru, Edited by: Konstantin Philipp
Photo credit: “Photo of City during Evening” by allPhoto Bangkok (November 15, 2019) on PEXELS
