The Kyrgyz Republic gained independence in 1991. However, as the country is nestled firmly in the centre of Eurasia, its cities and people have long seen the passage of goods along the silk road, to and from China. The country was eventually governed by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, and post-independence, Kyrgyzstan continued to have deep ties with Russia. The country would join both the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). Through membership in these organisations, Kyrgyz citizens are able to work without a permit in Russia (thus ensuring remittances stay as a key source of the Kyrgyz economy), and the Russian military has a presence in the country. However, despite such close Russian ties, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has grown in prominence and volume, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. The country now finds itself caught between the two, and as Chinese influence will inevitably increase, it is important to understand the nature of this relationship.
For China, ensuring a positive Sino-Kyrgyz relationship is seen as an essential notch in China’s “belt”.
The Central Asian states are considered to be the “near abroad” of both China and Russia, but as Russia pursues a more confrontational geopolitical stance, China has arguably increasingly sought to boost its profile across Central Asia along more development-focused lines.
This is hardly without controversy, Chinese engagement in BRI member states has been sharply criticised in the past as having negative consequences for target states. This article will explain how similar discontentedness has emerged in Kyrgyzstan, particularly between the general population and the Kyrgyz government and will demonstrate the challenges that both local and Chinese forces face. It will argue how China should engage across the BRI, by focusing on material investments and doing it in a sustainable, human-focused manner.
China has invested a great deal into Kyrgyzstan, and is now the largest foreign investor in the country, contributing $221.5 million (29.7% of the total inflow) in the first 9 months of 2024, whereas Russia contributed $ 192.8 million (25.8%). Chinese investments in the country have been found in a range of different industries and have come from both private and public companies.
On one hand, the Kyrgyz government appears to have embraced the Chinese and their investments. In 2024, Kyrgyz foreign minister Zhееnbek Kulubaev declared that it was necessary to accelerate the development of a Chinese-Uzbek railway line that is to run across the country, thus facilitating easier distribution of goods across the region, and the Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov claimed that the project would bring an extra $200 million annually into the country.
Additionally, the Kyrgyz government have also begun talks with the Chinese government regarding the funding of hydropower projects along the Naryn river totalling $3.7 billion, which were initially planned to be funded by Russian investors, following concerns from the Russian government that they could not fund the project.
These projects, as well as Beijing’s potential status as the investor in them, have excited Kyrgyz government officials. During a speech in the Kyrgyz parliament, the Chief minister claimed that President Japarov, because of these projects, will become a figure comparable to Russian monarch Peter the Great. Thus, indicating that there is some element of nation and state-building to the motives of Kyrgyz leaders. Essentially, they believe that Chinese investment will guarantee their own roles in the history of modern Kyrgyzstan.
However, perceptions of China among the populace of Kyrgyzstan are not as positive. There is a large body of evidence that suggests discontent with China and Chinese investments among the Kyrgyz public. In early 2020, the construction of a $280 million logistic centre, that Chinese company One Lead One had planned to fund, was cancelled as a result of local protests against a Chinese “land grab”. This wasn’t the first challenge Chinese investments faced from the general public. A year before, 47 Chinese workers at a mine in Central Kyrgyzstan were injured when locals, who accused the mine of polluting the local water supply, stormed the complex, thus causing the government to suspend the mine’s operations. Surveys have also shown a generally sceptical attitude towards China and the Chinese. A survey of young Kyrgyz and Kazakh citizens saw only 7% of respondents view China as the most positive global power (vs Russia, the US, and the EU), and the spheres that caused the most concern were areas of human rights and foreign policy. Others have observed a significantly lower positive perception of China in Kyrgyzstan, even compared to its Central Asian neighbours.
It is clear that Chinese engagement in Kyrgyzstan has had a significant impact on the country. In terms of foreign investment, China has taken over Russia in being the main partner of the country. Kyrgyz officials have identified China as somewhat of a ‘magic money tree’ and have sought to reap its rewards. However, the citizens of the country remain far more sceptical of China. This reflects a trend of Chinese engagement across the Belt and Road. Governments, particularly those of developing countries, overwhelmingly welcome China, but populations remain sceptical.
If China wishes to expand the reach and capability of the BRI scheme it should focus on developing with a human-conscious focus. In many cases, as in Kyrgyzstan, China should prioritise responsible investment and behaviour. This could be done by prioritising investment in hospitals, roads, and bridges. In general, items that improve one’s quality of life instead of projects that exist only to extract or exploit natural resources. The BRI does have great potential, but it can only operate effectively with the consent of those affected most by it.
Written by Ewan Martin, Edited by Immanuel Herrmann
Photo Credit: Dmitry Sumskoy (Uploaded 18 February, 2020) on Unsplash
