In 2021, Turkish President Erdoğan received a map of the Turkic world by the representative of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which notably included a significant portion of Chinese and Russian territory. However, the Kremlin did not respond with the expected, or maybe even desired, outrage. Rather than reacting indignantly, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the map’s accuracy, noting that the true centre of the Turkic world was not Turkey but the Altai region — within Russia’s borders.
This moment was more than just a symbolic gesture. In recent years, Turkey has led a resurgence in Turkic unity, pushing for ever deeper institutional cooperation. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), launched in 2009, embodies Ankara’s ambition to build a political and economic bloc rooted in shared identity. The “Turkic World Vision 2040”, adopted at the OTS’ 8th Summit, lays out a roadmap for closer institutional ties.
But this rising influence places Turkey in a region historically dominated by Russia and increasingly shaped by China. As the war in Ukraine disrupts alliances, can Ankara truly lead the Turkic world, or will it remain a symbolic player in a game controlled by larger powers?
The Roots of Pan-Turkism
Pan-Turkism dates to the late 19th century, when Turkic intellectuals in the Russian Empire advocated for the unity of Turkic peoples. Simultaneously, Ottoman intellectuals looked towards Central Asia’s Turkic communities, fuelled by rising Turkish nationalism. Groups like the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) pushed for Turkism and Turanism, emphasising Turkic cultural and racial connections. Yet, despite this shared vision, political unification never materialised — even after the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917.
Pan-Turkism resurfaced after the USSR’s collapse in 1991 and continues to shape Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy, as evident in Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the prominence of Pan-Turkic themes in the 2023 elections. This vision of a “Turkic world” (Türk dünyası) stretching “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”, as coined by former Turkish President Demirel, reflects Turkey’s continuous ambition for a united Turkic community.
A Look Back at Turkish Foreign Policy
For much of the 20th century, Turkey’s foreign policy revolved around Western alliances, particularly NATO. Atatürk’s famous slogan “Peace at home, peace in the world” shaped Turkey’s cautious approach, keeping it distant from Turkic communities in Central Asia. After the USSR’s collapse, Turkey saw a chance to lead a Turkic community and showcase its strategic value to the West. President Turgut Özal argued this would benefit Turkey economically and politically, and “[…] by serving as a bridge to the Islamic post-Soviet world, demonstrate Ankara’s usefulness to Western states.”
Driven by dreams of a ‘Pan-Turkic World,’ Turkey shifted its focus to Central Asia. It was the first to recognise their independence, and expanded ties through economic and cultural initiatives. Diplomatic visits surged: over 1,170 delegations visited the Turkic republics during their first year of independence, while more than 140 bilateral cooperation agreements were signed by 1993. President Özal passed away the same year following an exhausting diplomatic tour of Central Asia. However, Pan-Turkic political parties in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remained weak, while Turkey’s political instability and an economic crisis in the mid-1990s led to unfulfilled promises.
In-between Giants
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 under Erdoğan, Turkey focused on strengthening ties through soft power and institutionalisation. The creation of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2009 helped formalise these ties. The inclusion of Uzbekistan (2019) and admission of Turkmenistan as an observer (2022) signals growing interest in Pan-Turkism across the region. The OTS serves as an umbrella for various cooperation institutions, such as the “Common Alphabet Commission”, aimed at promoting language unity. The significance of these efforts is underscored by the fact that the commission was chaired by a deputy chairperson of the ruling AKP, demonstrating the importance of Pan-Turkism to Ankara’s political agenda.
While Turkish officials, such as Ambassador to China Emin Önen, insist that the OTS does not follow ethnicity-based policy “among its members or in 3rd countries”, others, like Azerbaijani president Aliyev have made contrasting claims. Statements such as, “The Turkic world does not consist of independent Turkic states only, its geographical boundaries are broader”, referring to “compatriots living beyond the countries that are members (…)”. Such rhetoric could fuel concerns about domestic interference, particularly in Russia and China, which both have large Turkic minorities. Adding to these tensions, Burhanettin Duran, Turkey’s current Deputy Foreign Minister, has argued that Turkey should adopt a “balancing role to ensure that Beijing does not engage with the Turkic world as it has with Africa.” Declarations like these underscore Ankara’s ambition to position itself as a key player in the region.
Despite official assurances that the OTS is not seeking to redraw borders, its growing influence may seem threatening from a realpolitik perspective. Neither Beijing nor Moscow are likely to take these assurances at face value, especially owed to Turkey’s NATO membership. Major powers rarely remain passive as competing powers rise – they respond. As the OTS’ influence continues to expand, Russia and China are likely to act to safeguard their interests in the region.
Pan-Turkism: Vision or Illusion?
The war in Ukraine has given Turkey a chance to expand its influence in Central Asia, but Ankara remains careful not to challenge Russia or China directly.
As Alparslan Türkeş, founder of the MHP and Grey Wolves, stated in his doctrine: “It is the most natural and sacred right for every Turk to want, wish and have good intentions for the liberation of Turks who are under the rule of others. But we always consider it essential to be realistic in our nationalism and to be on a path that will never lead Turkey into dangers” This perspective underscores that Pan-Turkism, at least in Turkey’s mainstream nationalist thought, has never been about redrawing borders, emphasising solidarity without jeopardising Turkey’s own security. Even those who acknowledge the cultural and historical ties among Turkic nations recognise the limits of this unity in practice.
This limitation was underscored yet again during the first EU-Central Asia Summit in April 2025, where Central Asian states reaffirmed their commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a joint statement they declared: “In the same spirit, we reaffirmed our strong commitment to the relevant UNSC Resolution 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).” These resolutions denounce the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, deem it legally invalid, and call on all states not to recognise it. To this day, Turkey remains the only country that acknowledges it as a sovereign state. This collective stance — despite Northern Cyprus having been admitted as an observer to the OTS in 2022 — highlights the limited influence of Pan-Turkism as a guiding force in foreign policy.
As former Kyrgyz politician Bakyt Beshimov put it, the idea of a united Turkic world is “about the past, not about the future” and involves “a mystification of the so-called Turkic togetherness. Even in the past, Turkic nations were happily fighting with each other.”
Turkey’s growing ties with Central Asia reflect a shifting regional dynamic, but its role remains more symbolic than transformative.
As countries look beyond Russia and China, Ankara’s focus on shared identity and cultural diplomacy offers a softer alternative to hard power. But in a region undergoing major political realignments, Turkey remains a player, not a kingmaker.
Author: Sarah Pavlis, Editor: Marlene Palan
Photo credit: “President Recep Tayyi Erdoğan and MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli shake hands as they meet at Bahceli’s home in Ankara”, Jan. 9, 2025 (AA Photo)
