“India’s new foreign policy marks not so much a repudiation of Nehru as a reinterpretation of his emphasis on autonomy and national interest.”

— C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon

As India’s global influence continues to rise, its foreign policy has become an issue of increasing international interest. Domestically, the Modi government continues to push the narrative that India is in the process of correcting the missteps of Nehru’s inaugural government in 1947, particularly by distancing itself from what it considers Nehru’s excessively idealistic ambitions. However, one could argue that this perspective is flawed, given the deeply strategic underpinning of Nehru’s foreign policy. From the moment he assumed office as Prime Minister of a nation still reeling from the strains of late British colonial rule and the Partition, Nehru pursued policies aimed at safeguarding India’s national interests and securing its place in the emerging world order. This aligns with the core objectives of India’s contemporary foreign policy—namely, maintaining strategic autonomy, advancing its national interests through trade agreements and strategic partnerships, and safeguarding its undisputed role as the leading power in South Asia. The conflicts of the 1960s and those of today bear resemblance in the sense that India remains focused on defending its sovereignty against those who threaten it.

Often, it is the misinterpretation of Nehru’s moral rhetoric as idealism, rather than strategy, that leads to his diplomacy being misinterpreted. His ideas of peace and cooperation, with an emphasis on anti-colonial solidarity, were seen as abstract aspirations. Still, one could view them as tools he used to amplify the influence of a newly independent India, whose limited economic and political power constrained its role in an international system dominated by the two Cold War blocs.

At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Nehru rejected the prevailing assumption that newly independent states would align with one side of the Cold War. He insisted that India “belong(ed) to neither” side and that it would not “lose (its) identity” by aligning. Instead, he believed that “the moral force of Asia and Africa […] must […] count”. While many assumed this to be a straightforward rejection of strategic thinking, Nehru pointed out that an obsession with military strength could lead countries to move “away from the right track”. Nehru maintained his belief that moral legitimacy was a source of influence and power for post-colonial states. He emphasised that India would not become a pawn in the global contest, declaring, “we do not intend to be playthings of others […] we propose to stand on our own feet”. Nehru later reflected upon the 1955 conference as the political emergence of new nations through “practical idealism with emphasis on self-respect and independence” rather than force or coercion. The idea of strategic autonomy is central to modern India’s foreign policy, and is considered a direct product of Nehru’s non-alignment policy.

While the language and methods have evolved, the core principle of preserving India’s freedom to make independent choices, interest-driven decisions, remains unchanged.

Today, India engages with multiple major powers: the United States through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), enforcing India’s maritime and technological ambitions; Russia, through defence and energy ties; and China, with a dual role as a major trading partner and a constant challenger in their common borders. This closely parallels Nehru’s own balancing act between Washington and Moscow during his tenure. Akin to his ambition of being the leader of the post-colonial world is the belief that today, India is the “voice of the Global South”, a notion that has been frequently invoked during its G20 presidency. The continuity across India’s policies in both eras indicates that today’s approach is not a break from Nehru’s supposedly idealistic policies, but rather an evolved adaptation shaped by the realities of contemporary global politics. While Nehru focused on diplomacy and moral authority, Modi has utilised economic leverage and strategic partnerships. It is important to note that both approaches are driven by the same core principles: safeguarding India’s autonomy and asserting its role as a global power.

Nehru’s claims of moral legitimacy were far from uncontested. The constraints he placed on political opposition, his dismissal of Kerala’s first elected communist government and his handling of Kashmir exposed the differences between principle and practice. India’s defeat in the 1962 war with China exposed the limits of relying on moral authority and diplomacy alone to protect national interests. Similarly, while Modi calls upon national resurgence and civilisational identity, his policies have been extremely pragmatic in nature, with his balancing act in maintaining relations with the superpowers of today. While their methods might differ, their goals remain similar. A major difference between Nehru’s India and Modi’s India is the latter’s far greater capacity to act on its strategic goals.

Today, India boasts a globally competitive economy, a capable military, and a level of international recognition. As a result, modern “realistic” policies appear rather assertive, more inclined to enter transactional relations and less hesitant to project India’s power. But it is vital to consider it as an evolution that does not negate Nehru’s legacy, but in fact accomplishes his legacy. A notable change lies in the language used—Modi’s India adopts a more strategically pragmatic tone than Nehru’s moral persuasion—yet the fundamental aims of autonomy, dignity and self-reliance remain remarkably similar. As India resists being pulled into exclusive alliances today and seeks to maintain ties with both the West and Russia during the Russia-Ukraine conflict—despite pressure from both sides, including US tariffs imposed as a result of India’s continued purchases of Russian oil and military equipment—it is effectively applying the same principles that Nehru followed during the early ages of the Cold War.

Revisiting Nehru’s foreign policy challenges the simplistic binary of “idealism versus realism”. As Nehru wrote in The Discovery of India, “we live in a world in which ideas and ideals cannot be neglected; but we must also act in accordance with reality”. His vision was one of ethical realism, of a diplomatic policy that used values not merely in name but as instruments of ensuring the country’s position during uncertain times. In many respects, Modi’s foreign policy follows the trajectory established by Nehru, albeit using modern strategies and tools. In a multipolar world which is characterised by uncertainty and strategic competition, Nehru’s policies remain a relevant guide. Nehru had once stated, “we will not take part (in war) unless we have to defend ourselves,” emphasising the balance between principle and self-interests. While Nehru’s India inspired moral leadership in a divided world, today’s India seeks strategic balance in a fragmented one. Yet, both approaches share a common objective: ensuring that India shapes its own destiny rather than allowing others to do so.

Written by Govind Anoop, Edited by Valerie Schicke

Photo Credit: Daniel Stiel (uploaded September 23, 2023) on Unsplash.